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Abstract
This paper argues that the telic/atelic distinction cannot be reduced to a distinction 
between countable and non-countable predicates in the verbal domain. I show that 
telic and atelic predicates behave alike with respect to most countability tests and that 
both are cumulative. No verbal predicates, whether telic or atelic, can be directly 
modified by cardinal numerals, but all can be modified by a numeral together with 
the classifier time(s). I suggest that VPs do not denote countable sets. However, VPs, 
and in particular telic VPs, may denote sets of individuable events, making telic VPs 
similar to object mass nouns since the entities in the denotations of these VPs are 
individuable but not countable. Two general conclusions can be drawn from this. 
First, the contrast between atelic and telic predicates should be formulated in terms 
of constraints on individuability, not countability. Second, contrary to, e.g. Bach 
(1986), the mass/count distinction does not structure the verbal domain, and thus, in 
languages such as English, the nominal and verbal domains are very different. 
Resumo
Este artigo defende que a distinção télico/atélico não pode ser reduzida a uma 
distinção entre predicados contáveis e não contáveis no domínio verbal. Demonstro 
que  predicados télico e atélico se comportam da mesma forma em relação à maioria 
dos testes de contabilidade e que ambos são cumulativos. Nenhum predicado verbal, 
télico ou atélico, pode ser diretamente modificado por numerais cardinais, mas 
podem ser modificados por um numeral  junto com classificadores de tempo. Sugiro 
que VPs não denotam conjuntos contáveis. No entanto, VPs, e em particular VPs 
télicos, podem denotar conjuntos de eventos individualizados, tornando VPs télicos 
similares a nomes de massa objeto, já que as entidades na denotação desses VPs são 
individualizadas, mas não contáveis. Duas conclusões gerais podem decorrer daí.  A 
primeira é o contraste entre predicados télicos e atélicos que deve ser formulado em 
termos de restrições sobre individualidade e não contabilidade. A segunda, contrária a 
Bach (1986), prevê que a distinção massivo/contável não estrutura o domínio verbal, e 
assim, em línguas como o inglês, os domínios nominal e verbal são muito diferentes.
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Introduction1
This paper reconsiders the claim made by Bach (1986) that the mass/count contrast surfaces in the verbal domain under the guise of the atelic/telic distinction. I show, contra this position, that the contrast between 
atelic and telic verbal predicates cannot be reduced to a contrast in countability. 
Instead, following Rothstein (2010), I distinguish between individuability and 
countability, and argue that telic and atelic predicates can be characterised in 
terms of whether or not they denote individuable events. 
 The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section, section 2, 
I consider two aspects of the argument that the atelic/telic distinction parallels 
the mass/count contrast. I consider first Bach (1986), who discusses verbal 
modification, and then Krifka (1989, 1992, 1998), who argues that mass nouns 
and atelic predicates are cumulative, while count nouns and telic predicates are 
quantized. In section 3, I show that countability tests, including those discussed 
by Bach (1986), do not group atelic and telic predicates into two distinct classes. 
In section 4, I reconsider the cumulativity property, and show that it too does not 
distinguish between atelic and telic predicates. In section 5, I review arguments 
from Rothstein (1999), which support the claim that atelic and telic predicates 
cannot be distinguished using distributive modifying predicates, and show 
that there is, on the other hand, a strong contrast between verbal predicates 
and APs. VPs such as be sick in general allow distributive modification, while 
1  Research for this paper was supported by Israel Science Foundation grant 1345-13 to Susan 
Rothstein. I should like to thank an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments.  
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minimally contrasting APs such as sick do not. This suggests that VPs, but not 
APs have individuals in their denotations. In the final section, I suggest that 
while the atelic/telic contrast is not a contrast in countability, it does involve a 
contrast in individuability, as originally argued in Rothstein (2004). We know 
now from multiple researchers (BARNER; SNEDEKER, 2005; ROTHSTEIN, 
2010, 2017; SCHWARZSCHILD, 2011; LANDMAN, 2011, 2016 and many 
others) that mass nouns can be divided into those which are naturally atomic, 
so-called ‘object mass nouns’, and those which denote stuff which does not come 
in inherently individuable units, i.e. ‘substance mass nouns’. I argue that in the 
verbal domain, all verbal predicates are mass, and that the atelic/telic distinction 
most plausibly parallels the substance/object mass noun distinction, with object 
mass nouns and telic VPs denoting sets of naturally individuable entities (objects 
and events respectively), while substance mass nouns and atelic predicates 
denote sets of entities which do not come with natural criteria for individuating 
individuals. 
1. Is the telic/atelic distinction a contrast in countability?
1.1 Bach: processes vs. events
The quest for parallels between the nominal and the verbal domain has 
been a central issue in linguistic theory at least since Chomsky’s seminal Remarks 
on Nominalization (1970). While Chomsky’s paper discussed lexical semantics 
and the mapping between lexical semantics and syntax, formal semanticists have 
focussed on different aspects of possible parallelism, including countability.
 Let us assume that the model for interpreting natural language includes 
a sorted domain of individuals, including at least the set of entities at type d 
and the set of events at type e. Nouns denote sets of entities at type <d,t> and, 
following Parsons (1990) and Landman (2000), verbs denote sets of events at 
type <e,t>. If the fundamental difference between nominal and verbal predicates 
lies only in the sortal type of the individual members of the sets they denote, 
then we might well expect properties of the one domain to be replicated in the 
other. A striking property of the nominal domain in many languages, including 
English and Brazilian Portuguese, is that nouns are divided into those which are 
countable (count nouns), which can be modified directly by numerals as in three 
cats, and those which cannot be modified directly by numerals (mass nouns), as 
in #three muds, #three furnitures. So, an obvious question is whether, at least in 
count/mass languages, this distinction is replicated in the verbal domain.
 The classification of verbal predicates has traditionally focused on lexical 
aspect, and in particular on the telic-atelic distinction, i.e. the contrast between 
312
predicates which lexically specify an endpoint, such as arrive and build a house, 
called ‘telic’ and those which do not, such as live in Amsterdam and love my cat, 
called ‘atelic’. These are distinguished by different grammatical properties, in 
particular temporal modification. Telic predicates are modified by in an hour 
type adverbials, but not for an hour type adverbials, as in (1), while the opposite 
is true of atelic predicates, as in (2):
(1)  a. We will arrive at Schiphol in an hour/#for an hour.
 b. John built a house in a month /#for a month.
(2)   a. John ran for an hour/#in an hour.
 b. Mary lived in Amsterdam for ten years/#in ten years. 
Telic predicates such as arrive share with count nouns such as cat the 
property that the singular individuals in their denotations are inherently 
discrete, and what counts as ‘one’ (cat, arrival event) is determined independent 
of context by the lexical meaning of the predicate. What counts as one cat is 
determined by our knowledge of the meaning of the word cat (cat denotes 
a property which holds of a small animal that says “meow”) and what counts 
as one event of arriving is determined by our knowledge of the meaning of 
the word arrive (arrive denotes a property true of an event of changing from 
not being at a specified location to being at that location). It is thus natural to 
ask what the relation between telicity and countability is, and more specifically 
whether telicity can be reduced to countability. 
 Bach (1986) was the first to suggest that the aspectual contrast between 
atelic and telic predicates is an expression of the mass/count distinction in the 
verbal domain. He restricts his attention to what he calls ‘eventive’ predicates, 
excluding statives such as live in Amsterdam, and he subdivides eventive 
predicates into processes and events. In the terminology of Vendler (1957/1967), 
processes include activities such as run and accomplishments with mass or bare 
plural themes such as drink wine, while events include achievements such as 
arrive and accomplishments with quantized themes such as drink three glasses 
of wine.
 Bach argues that different quantity modifiers apply to process and event 
predicates, and these differences parallel the differences between the quantity 
expressions which modify mass and count nouns. In (3) and (4) the modifiers 
lots of/a lot (of) and much modify the mass noun wine and the atelic process 
predicate drink/eat, but not count nouns or telic predicates, as in (5):
 
(3) a. John drank lots of/a lot of wine. 
 b.  John drank/ate a lot.
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(4)     a.    John didn’t drink much wine.
 b.    John didn’t drink much
(5) a.  #much/lots of cat 
 b.  #John didn’t arrive much/ a lot. 
 c.  #John ate three apples a lot.
Furthermore, both count nouns and telic predicates can be modified by 
count modifiers, but this is infelicitous with mass nouns or atelic predicates. 
(6)  a.     John ate three apples.
 b. John ate an apple three times
 c. John arrived (late) three times.
(7)   #John drank/ate/slept three times.
        
Bach suggests that processes like eat/drink/sleep are modified by non-
cardinal expressions such as much/a lot because they are essentially mass 
predicates, while telic predicates denoting events are countable. To the degree 
that examples like (7) are felicitous, they are the result of coercion, just like 
drink three wines/coffees, where mass nouns are used as count predicates and 
are directly modified by cardinals.  
1.2 Krifka: cumulativity vs quantization 
Krifka (1989, 1992, 1998) argues that the same formal properties of 
predicates can be used to distinguish count predicates from mass predicates and 
telic predicates from atelic predicates. Both (singular) count predicates and telic 
predicates are quantized but not cumulative, while mass predicates and atelic 
predicates (as well as plural count predicates) are non-quantized and cumulative.
 Quantization is defined in (8):
(8)    A predicate P is quantized iff:
  ∀x[P(x) → ¬∃x[ x⊏y ∧ P(y)]
  “If a predicate P is quantized, no element in P has a proper part   
  which is also in P.”
Singular count predicates such as cat are quantized since a proper part of 
a cat, for example the cat’s front paw, is not a cat. Telic predicates such as arrive 
and build a house as well as delimited activity predicates like run a mile are 
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quantized. An incomplete part of an arriving event or a building-a-house event 
or a running-a-mile event is not itself an event of arriving or house-building or 
running a mile, and thus not in the denotation of the relevant predicate. This is 
why telic predicates induce the imperfective paradox (Dowty 1979), as shown 
in (9): 
(9) a.  Mary was arriving at the station DOES NOT ENTAIL Mary   
  arrived at the station.
 b. Jan was building a house DOES NOT ENTAIL Jan built a   
  house.
A sentence using the progressive makes reference to a part of an event 
including proper parts, and since telic predicates are quantized, a proper part of 
an event in VP cannot itself be an event in VP. Thus, the entailments in (9) do 
not go through. In this respect, telic predicates and singular count predicates are 
similar.
 In contrast, mass predicates such as water and atelic predicates such as run 
are not quantized, and proper parts of a quantity of water are considered water, 
while proper parts of an event of running are running events (as long as the 
parts are above a certain minimal size). As opposed to (9), entailments from the 
progressive to the simple past hold, as long as the event witnessing the entailing 
S is above the minimal size:
(10)   Mary was running ENTAILS Mary ran.
 The positive property characterizing atelic predicates and mass predicates 
(as well as plural count predicates) is cumulativity:
(11)   A predicate P is cumulative (upwardly homogeneous) iff:
         ∀x∀y[P(x) ∧ P(y) → P(x⊔y)]
  “If a predicate P is cumulative then for any x and y in P, the sum  
  of x and y is also in P”
The mass predicate water is cumulative since the sum of two quantities 
of water falls in the denotation of water. The atelic predicate run is cumulative 
since an event of running from say 13.00 to 14.00 and a second event of running 
from say 14.00 to 15.00 can be summed to form an event in the denotation 
of run. A count predicate like cat is non-cumulative, since the sum of two 
individuals in the domain of cat does not fall in the denotation of cat but in the 
denotation of the plural predicate cats. A similar argument makes build a house 
non-cumulative, since a sum of singular events in build a house is not in the 
denotation of build a house. Note that atelic predicates such as run can be made 
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telic and quantized by the addition of delimiting modifiers, as in run a mile, just 
as mass nouns like water can be made into quantized predicates by the addition 
of quantity modifiers, as in two litres of water. As Krifka writes: “If we have two 
events of running, then they form together an event of running; and if we have 
an event of running a mile, then no proper part of it is an event of running a 
mile.” (Krifka 1992, p34).
 There has been considerable discussion in the literature about whether 
quantization is the property which defines singular count nouns (see e.g. 
Zucchi and White 2001, Rothstein, to appear). It has often been noted that 
there are various cases in which quantization fails to characterise count nouns 
appropriately, in particular there are non-quantized count nouns such as line, 
plane (MITTWOCH, 1985), sequence and twig (KRIFKA, 1992), fence, wall, 
and hedge (ROTHSTEIN, 1999, 2010). There is, however, agreement about 
the intuition underlying the use of quantization as a defining property: singular 
count nouns denote sets of contextually discrete minimal entities, which results 
in these predicates being countable, while mass nouns and plural count nouns 
are cumulative.   
 Against this background, we can now formulate our central question: is 
cumulative vs. non-cumulative reference, as expressed in the contrast between 
mass nouns and singular count nouns, also at the basis of the atelic/telic distinction 
in the verbal domain? In the next section I will show that the atelic/telic contrast 
in fact does not parallel the mass/count contrast. In section 4, I will consider 
cumulativity in the verbal domain and show that the atelic/telic contrast cannot 
be expressed in terms of cumulativity. 
2. Do telic and atelic predicates show differences with respect to 
countability?
Our first observation is that contrary to what Bach (1986) suggests, all 
lexical aspectual categories of VPs can be modified by counting expressions like 
three times. (12) gives examples of telic VPs which can easily be modified by 
numericals, but (13) shows that atelic predicates can also be easily modified by 
these expressions. 
(12)  a.  John jumped three times.               
  (semelfactive)
 b. Mary has written a book three times.     
  (accomplishment)
 c.  I have landed in São Paulo airport three times.    
  (achievement)
316
(13)  a.  I have been in Brazil three times.    (state)
 b.  I haven’t slept more than three times this week!  
  (activity)  
 c.  Bill has drunk whisky three times.   
  (activity) 
 d.  I only smoked once in my life!      
  (activity)
Clearly the examples in (13) are atelic as they can be modified by for–
temporal expressions, as in be in Brazil for a week, sleep for twelve hours and 
so on, but the counting modifier is still completely natural. Bach suggests that 
counting atelic predicates, when it is possible, is the result of the same coercion 
which allows us to say things like I drank three beers, but the two processes 
do not look the same. The coercion which allows the mass-to-count shift in 
the nominal domain requires a conventionalised division into portions. (14a) is 
felicitous, especially in a restaurant context, as is (14b), but the portions must be 
conventional portions, even if they are not all the same size. Examples like (14c) 
are infelicitous because servings or portions of water are not usually determined 
by saucers or cups. Different lexical items are open to portion readings to 
different degrees. (14d) has a plurality of kinds reading as its first reading, and 
the portion reading is secondary. (14e) is infelicitous without heavy contextual 
support.
(14)  a. I drank two coffees (a large one and a small one).
 b.  Last night I drank three beers (one pint and two half-pints). 
 c.  #They brought three waters, a saucer of water, a glass of water   
  and a cup of water.    
 d.  Last night I drank three wines.
 e.    #The nurse wiped up three bloods.
In contrast, the examples in (13) are all acceptable without any supporting 
context and, crucially, without any information about what the dimensions of 
the counted events actually are. (13c) may tell us that there were three occasions 
on which Bill drank whisky, but not how long these whisky-drinking events 
were or how much whisky was drunk. This suggests that the process allowing 
counting of atelic eventualities is very different from coercion, which allows 
mass nouns to denote countable portions. 
 Our second observation is that numerals never directly modify any verbal 
predicates, but must combine with times, as in all the examples in (12) and (13). 
This contrasts with the nominal domain, where numerals directly modify count 
nouns, as in three cats, but only modify mass nouns in conjunction with a 
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classifier, as in three bottles of wine, three litres of wine, three pieces of furniture. 
As a consequence, the numeral phrase modifying a telic accomplishment, as in 
read War and Peace three times, looks grammatically like a counting phrase 
in the mass domain where the numeral has to combine with a classifier before 
modifying the noun, rather than like counting in the count domain where the 
numeral combines directly with the noun. (There are three special lexical items 
once, twice and thrice, which modify VPs directly, but these are completely 
interchangeable with one time, two times and three times, and suggest that time 
has been incorporated into their meaning.) 
  Landman (2006) argues that there is good semantic evidence to 
assume that time in three times is functioning like a classifier. He starts from 
Rothstein’s (1995) account of examples like (15), where time appears as a head 
in quantificational adverbials like (15a), as well as in definite NP adverbials like 
(15b).
(15) a.  I opened the door every time the bell rang.
 b.  I opened the door the three times that the bell rang.
Rothstein (1995) assumes that the domain of individuals IND is sorted 
into (at least) entities and events, and argues that time is a sortal which denotes 
the set of events E ⊆ IND. In (15), time is the head of the relative clause and thus 
binds the trace in the adverbial position in the relative clause, as in (16).
(16)    every/the three [timesi (that) the bell rang t1] 
  
Semantically, times guarantees that the trace denotes a variable in the 
domain of events.
 Landman (2006) argues that while the expressions in (15) are indirect 
counters for events, three times is a direct counter. He shows that three times 
must be a quasi-intensional modifier which imposes what he calls a grid structure 
on the denotation of the VP predicate. This must be the case because (17) is 
ambiguous:
(17)   Susan reviewed two papers three times.
This can be true either if there were three different groups of two papers, 
each of which Susan reviewed (on three occasions she was asked to review two 
papers) or if there were two different papers each of which Susan reviewed three 
times (each of these papers was sent to her separately three times, maybe by 
three different journals). Thus, put in oversimplified terms, Landman argues 
that three times does not simply count events, but does so by first picking out 
the sets of events which count, contextually, as one. In the case of (17), the events 
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counted by three times can be either events of reviewing two papers or events of 
reviewing a single paper. The details of Landman’s analysis are too complicated 
to discuss here, but the effect is that times indeed has the semantics of a classifier 
in that it maps a set of events onto a set of countable events by deciding what 
counts, in context, as one event. But if this is the case, then, since all VPs are 
modified by n times and not by bare numerals, it seems that all VPs are counted 
via classifier constructions, in which case they are all more like mass predicates 
than count predicates. 
 Count noun plural predicates can be counted via classifiers, as in (18a), 
but can also be counted without a classifier, as in (18b). Individuating sortal 
classifiers in the count domain are not acceptable, as in (18c):
(18)  a.  three groups of chairs
 b.  three chairs
 c. #three units of chair
In the verbal domain, a structure analogous to (18b) is impossible and a 
classifier time, is used in both singular and group readings.
 Our third observation focusses on the interpretation of a lot as in (19):
(19)  a.   I landed at Schiphol a lot last year.
 b.   I ran a lot yesterday.  
 c.   #I wrote a paper a lot yesterday.  
A lot can modify both telic and atelic predicates, but not necessarily with 
the same interpretation. In (19a), where the VP is telic, a lot has a ‘plurality of 
events’ reading, and (19a) asserts that there were many events of my landing at 
Schiphol last year. This interpretation seems to be equivalent to many times and 
often, and thus suggests a count-like interpretation of the VP. In (19b), where 
the VP is atelic, the natural interpretation is that I did a lot of running in a 
single event. Singular telic events cannot usually be modified by a lot, as in (19c). 
However, atelic verbs also allow a plurality of events interpretation of a lot, as 
in (20).
 
(20)  a.  I ran a lot, in fact every day.
 b.  I drink wine a lot, but never very much at any one time.
If the plurality of events interpretation of a lot is available with atelic VPs, 
then, according to Bach (1986), they have properties which they share with telic 
predicates and count nouns.
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  Finally, a fourth relevant observation concerns comparatives. As is well 
known, the comparative operator more can be used with both VPs and with 
NPs, as in (21). In (21a), where more modifies a count noun, the comparison 
is in terms of cardinality, and (21a) is true only if the number of sandwiches 
that Mary ate is greater than the number of sandwiches that John ate. In (21b), 
where the noun is mass, the comparison is in terms of volume (i.e. in terms of 
extent). In (21c), where more modifies a telic VP, the comparison is in terms of 
cardinality, comparing numbers of landing events, and thus similar to the count 
comparative in (21a). However, in (21d), where more modifies an atelic V, the 
comparison can be either in terms of cardinality, comparing number of running 
events (similar to (21a)), or in terms of extent, comparing the extents of two 
singular running events, (similar to the mass comparative in (21c)): 
(21)  a.  Mary ate more sandwiches than John.
 b.  Mary ate more bread than John.
 c.  Mary landed at Schiphol more than John did.
 d.  Mary ran more than John.
While, this seems to strengthen the parallel between atelic predicates 
and mass nouns on the one hand and telic predicates and count nouns on the 
other, downward comparisons add an extra dimension. English uses fewer for 
comparing count nouns and less for comparing mass nouns, as in (22):
(22)  a.  John read fewer /*less books than Mary.
         b.  John drank less/*fewer wine than Mary.
Strikingly, all VPs, whether telic or atelic are compared with less, as 
shown in (23). Note that the comparisons in (23a-c) can be in terms of length 
of activity or cardinality of events, while in (23d), where the predicate in an 
achievement verb, comparison can only be in terms of cardinality of events. 
(23)  a.  John ran less than Mary (did).
 b. John lived in Amsterdam less than Mary.
 c.  John read books less than Mary (did).
 d.  John lands at Schiphol less than he lands at Heathrow. 
Telic predicates with direct objects also show a contrast between cases 
where theme argument and the VP are compared, as in (24). The comparative 
word used to compare the theme depends on the mass/count status of the theme, 
while comparison of the VP always uses less:
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(24)  a. John built fewer houses than Mary. 
         b.  John built houses less than Mary.
Unambiguous comparisons of event cardinalities with non-achievement 
verbs are expressed by using fewer and the classifier times, as in (25a/b), while 
frequency (but not necessarily cardinality) can be compared using less often), as 
in (25c):
(25)   a.  John ran fewer times than Mary.  
 b.  John built houses fewer times than Mary.
 c.  John ran less often than Mary.
We will return to the interpretation of these sentences later. For now, 
what is relevant is that all VP comparisons behave in the same way with respect 
to choice of comparative operator, and the operator that is used is the operator 
used to compare mass nouns.  
  At this point, we have four pieces of evidence which seem to 
conflict with each other. (i) All VPs, whether telic or atelic, can be modified 
by a lot with a plurality of events readings (a count-like property). (ii) All VPs, 
whether telic or atelic, can be modified by three times (also, superficially a count-
like property).  (iii) However, three times is a classifier phrase, and the data thus 
suggests that all counting of VPs requires a classifier (a mass-like property). 
(iv) Finally, all downward comparisons use the mass operator less, (also a mass-
like property). Crucially, it seems that all VPs behave more or less in the same 
way with respect to each test, but with contradictory results with respect to 
countability. This suggests that verbal predicates cannot be categorised into 
two groups with respect to countability, and further, that we cannot obviously 
easily categorise VPs as either count or mass since they have properties of both. 
The only property consistently differentiating atelic event predicates from telic 
predicates, is that only atelic predicates can be modified by a lot when they 
denote sets of singular events. Before discussing this further, we will look in 
more detail at cumulativity and quantization.
3. Cumulativity and quantization in the nominal and verbal domain. 
If telic and atelic predicates show similar behaviour in counting and 
quantity modification contexts, then why do they apparently show different 
behaviour with respect to cumulativity and quantization? Close examination 
shows that testing VPs for cumulativity does not clearly distinguish between 
telic and atelic predicates. Furthermore, it does not explain why, to quote Krifka, 
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two events of running “form together an event of running” (KRIFKA, 1992, p. 
34), while two events of running a mile do not form an event of running a mile.
 Cumulativity in the nominal domain is about plurality. The definition 
of cumulativity, given in (11) and repeated here in (26), defines a cumulative 
predicate as one which is closed under sum, i.e. for any two entities in its 
denotation the sum of those entities is also in its denotation. 
(26)   A predicate P is cumulative (upwardly homogeneous) iff:
         ∀x∀y[P(x) ∧ P(y) → P(x⊔y)]
  “If a predicate P is cumulative, then for any x and y in P, the   
  sum of x and y are also in P.”
Mass nouns and plural count nouns are cumulative because they are 
closed under sum, and thus the sum of two quantities in the set they denote 
is also in that set, independent of whether the sum is spatially continuous or 
discontinuous, as shown in (27a/b). The wine and the books in these examples 
denote the sum of the entities brought by John and Mary.  Singular count nouns 
are not cumulative because they are not closed under sum, as shown in (27c).
 
(27)  a.  John brought wine and Mary brought wine. The/that wine is   
  for dinner.
 b.  John brought books and Mary brought books. The books are for  
  Bill.
 c.  #John brought a book and Mary brought a book. The book is   
  for Bill.  
The contrast is not minimal, since English requires an indefinite article, 
but (27c) still shows that a sum of two items in the denotation of book cannot 
also be in book.
 Plural nouns and mass nouns will always be cumulative since they are 
closed under sum. Since verbal predicates, whether telic or atelic, include both 
singular events and pluralities of events in their denotations, they too should 
be cumulative. Thus, an event of John landing at Schiphol airport on Monday 
and an event of his landing at the same airport on Tuesday, as well as the sum 
of these two events, are all in the denotation of land at Schiphol airport. Event 
predicates like eat an apple can denote pluralities of events, for example when 
they distribute over plural subjects, as in John and Mary ate an apple.  As we 
have already seen in (19a) and (20), and repeated here in (28), the availability of 
the plural interpretation of the VP for both telic and atelic VPs means that it can 
be modified by a lot with a plurality of events interpretation, as well as by the 
adverb often. 
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(28)   a.  John landed at Schiphol airport often.
 b.  John ran often.
Plural interpretations do not need to be explicitly marked by an adverbial 
or a plural subject, with either telic or atelic predicates. The question When did 
you VP? presupposes that an event of your doing VP has taken place, but allows 
for a single date or a plurality of dates as an answer, depending on whether what 
witnesses the answer is a singular event or a sum of events, as seen in (29):
(29) a.   Question: When did you read War and Peace?  
  Answer 1: In 1972
  Answer 2: In 1972 and in 1996.
 
 b.  When were you in Brazil?
  Answer 1: Only in 2008.
  Answer 2: In 2008, 2011 and 2016.  
 
 c.  When did you eat an apple?
  Answer 1: On Monday morning.
  Answer 2: On Monday morning and on Tuesday morning.
So, as far as cumulativity is concerned, both atelic and telic VPs are 
cumulative, in the same way that plural and mass nouns are. Cumulativity 
cannot be at the root of the atelic/telic distinction, since all VP predicates are 
closed under sum, whether telic or atelic.
 What then, is the relevance of the fact that, to quote Krifka, two events 
of running “form together an event of running” (Krifka 1992, p34), while two 
events of building a house or running a mile do not form an event which falls 
under the same denotation? In this respect, atelic and telic predicates do seem 
genuinely to differ, as seen in the contrast between (30), on the one hand, where 
the predicate is atelic, and (31) and (32) on the other, where the verbal predicate 
is telic:
(30)    John ran from 1 pm to 2 pm and he ran/carried on running   
  from 2pm to 3pm. 
    -  So John ran (once) from 1:00 pm to 3:00 pm.
    -  So he ran for two hours.
    -  So he was still running at 2:00 pm/2:30 pm.
 
(31)    John arrived at Schiphol at 1:00 pm and at 2:00 pm.  
  -   So he arrived twice.
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            -  #So he was still arriving at 2:00 pm.
     -  #So he arrived for two hours.    
      
(32)    John wrote an essay last week. And he wrote an essay this week.
  -   So he wrote an essay twice/wrote two essays.
     -  #So he wrote an essay for two weeks.
    -  #So he was still writing an essay this week. 
The answer is that this contrast is not a contrast in cumulativity, since the 
issue is not whether the (plural) sum of two events in P is also in P. Rather, the 
question is whether pluralities can, under appropriate conditions, be put together 
to make a bigger single event. In (30), crucially, two singular events in run are 
put together to form a new singular event in run. (31) and (32) show that this is 
what cannot be done with arrive and write an essay. Rothstein (2004), observing 
this contrast, suggested that atelicity should be defined in terms of a property 
called S-cumulation. A predicate P is S-cumulative if it allows two events e1 and 
e2 in P to be summed and then mapped onto a new singular event temporally 
co-extensive with e1⊔e2. (30) shows that run is S-cumulative, while arrive at 
Schiphol and write an essay are not. 
 S-cumulativity distinguishes between predicates denoting events which 
can be extended temporally, and those which cannot. At first sight, it seems 
that we have finally managed to recreate the mass/count distinction in the 
verbal domain. Singular events in the denotation of atelic predicates like run 
can be extended indefinitely, in the same way that single quantities of water can 
be added to indefinitely, and can still remain single quantities of water. Telic 
predicates like write an essay/land at Schiphol cannot be extended in this way, 
just as an entity in the denotation of chair or pen cannot be indefinitely extended. 
However, even S-cumulativity does not distinguish telic from atelic predicates. 
Telic predicates fail to be S-cumulative only when the theme argument is either 
singular or modified by a numeral with an exactly interpretation. While (33a) is 
neither cumulative nor S-cumulative, the examples in (33b) are cumulative and 
S-cumulative.
 
(33) a. John ate (exactly) one apple. 
 b.  John ate at least one apple/many apples/more than one apple.
Any two events of eating many apples which are temporally adjacent 
can be put together to form a singular event of eating many apples. An event 
of eating at least one apple can be extended by the eating of another apple, and 
it is still an event in the denotation of eat at least one apples/eat more than one 
apple. But, as (34) shows, these examples are nonetheless telic, since they can be 
modified by in half an hour and also induce the imperfective paradox. 
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(34)  a.  John ate at least one apple/many apples/more than one apple in   
  half an hour.
 b.  John was eating at least three apples as part of the competition   
  DOES NOT ENTAIL John ate at least three apples as part of   
  the competition.
 c.  #John ate at least three apples for half an hour. 
 
Note also that extending (or diminishing) the boundaries of an event in 
this way is not like extending (or diminishing) the boundaries of a quantity of 
water. An event of running can only be extended temporally by postponing its 
end point (possibly indefinitely), i.e. along a directed temporal axis, whereas a 
quantity in the denotation of a mass noun can be extended in multiple directions. 
As a correlate, a quantity of water can be split in any way into two quantities 
of water, e.g. by plunging a bowl into it and removing the water caught in the 
bowl. An event of running can only be split into two events of running by 
separating a final part from an initial part. So, an event of running from 1:00 pm 
to 4:00 pm can be split into an event of running from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm and 
from 2:00 pm to 4:00 pm, but extracting a single event of running from 2:00 
pm to 3:00 pm will not split the original event into two events, but into three. 
 The conclusion is that neither cumulativity nor S-cumulativity can be 
used to characterise the contrast between telic and atelic predicates, and that, 
as a consequence, the parallels between atelic predicates and mass nouns and 
between telic predicates and count nouns are only superficial. 
 Intuitively, atelic predicates do seem to be characterised by the fact that 
they can be indefinitely extended. Dowty (1979) and Rothstein (2004, 2008a) 
show that activities can be treated as iterations of minimal activities, reanalysed 
as a single event. An extended event in run is composed out of stringing together 
temporally overlapping minimal events of running, reanalysed as a single event. 
Since the iteration has no limit, the event is potentially infinitely extendable and 
atelic. However, as Landman and Rothstein (2012a,b) show, what is crucial in 
defining an atelic VP, is that the properties expressed by both V and VP must 
be applicable both to the event as a whole and to its parts. This property is 
termed “incremental homogeneity”, and guarantees extendibility of an event. If 
a predicate is incrementally homogeneous, it can be indefinitely extended on the 
temporal axis.2 Thus, run in the park is incrementally homogenous and atelic 
since all parts of the event are both running events and running-in-the-park 
events, but run a mile is not, since its proper parts are running events but not 
running-a-mile events. 
2  These issues raise fundamental questions about event identity too complex to discuss here. 
See Landman 1992, 2008, who shows that event semantics requires a concept of cross-temporal 
event identity, which allows an event to be extended in time while remaining the same singular 
event.  
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 We can use this to explain why a non-plural, extent reading of a lot is 
available in (35a) but not in in (35b,c):
(35)  a.   John ran a lot yesterday.     (=19b)
 b.  #John wrote a paper a lot. (=19c)
 c.  #John ran a mile a lot. 
In (35a), a lot modifies the incrementally homogeneous run. John’s 
running can be analysed as a single event composed out of multiple minimal 
running events and a lot, as a VP modifier, adds the information that the singular 
run event is composed of many events of the same type as the VP. Thus, in 
a sense, the extent reading of a lot reduces to the plurality reading, since the 
singular event witnessing (35a) is constructed out of a large plurality of minimal 
events.  In (35b,c) this extent reading is not possible since run a mile and write a 
paper are not composed of multiple events of the same type. If the direct object 
in (35b) is deleted, a reading parallel to (35a) becomes possible: 
(36)   John wrote a lot yesterday.
 The singular event interpretation of a lot is possible only with activities 
and not with states, even though states are also atelic. The examples in (37a,b) 
have only a plurality of events reading in which a lot is semantically equivalent 
to often.  
 
(37) a.  Mary knew the answer a lot. (= she knew the answer often, not  
  for a long time)
 b.  The sock lay under the bed a lot (= it lay there often, not for a  
  long time)
The example in (38) illustrates an additional use of a lot, as a modifier of 
intensity. 
(38)   Mary hated John a lot.
Arguably, it can also have the plurality of events reading, in which Mary 
hated John on multiple occasions. However, it cannot have the extended event 
reading parallel to (35a), in which the sentence asserts that Mary hated John for 
a long time, i.e. that her hating John consisted of an extended continuous string 
of multiple hating events. This strongly suggests that the extended iteration 
reading in (35a) and (36), is triggered by the semantic properties of activity 
predicates and not by atelicity in general.
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4.  APs vs VPs
Before returning to countability in the VP domain, we review briefly 
data from Rothstein (1999), which clarifies that VPs do indeed denote sets of 
possibly individuable events, which can be modified by distributives and other 
predicates sensitive to individuability. 
 Rothstein (1999) looks at the minimal contrasts between two kinds of 
small clause complements of verbs like make, those small clauses where the 
predicate is a VP, and those where it is an AP. All VP predicates, whether telic 
or atelic, can be counted, can be modified with a plurality-of-events reading, 
and can be temporally located, while none of these properties hold of AP 
complements, even when the syntactic difference is minimal. The fact that the 
predicates are in small clauses, and thus are not marked by tense or aspect shows 
that the contrast really is between the VP, which denotes a set of individuable 
events, and the AP, which denotes a state. We cite the central examples here, 
referring the reader to the original paper for extended discussion and analysis. 
(39) shows that bare VPs can be modified. In (40), the small clause has an AP 
predicate, and three times can only modify the matrix verb. The reading is 
infelicitous because the framing PP suggests that there was only one event of 
making.
(39) a.   With one spell, the witch made John know the answer three  
  times. 
 b.   In one moment John be miserable/sick three times.
 
(40)  #In one moment, the witch made John miserable/sick three  
  times.
Three other properties correlate with this.  VP predicates, including 
atelic predicates, can be temporally located, while AP predicates can never be 
temporally located. (41a) is acceptable since yesterday can modify make while 
today can modify know the answer/be sick. (41b) is unacceptable since the AP 
cannot be modified by a temporal adverbial, and so today can only modify 
make, which is infelicitous since make is also modified by yesterday.
(41)   a.  Yesterday, the witch made John know the answer/be sick today.
   b. #Yesterday, The witch made John sick on today.
The every time quantifiers, illustrated in (15) above, can modify atelic as 
well as telic predicates, but can never modify APs. (42a) is compatible with there 
being one causing event which caused her to worry whenever the bell rang (e.g. 
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I told her that when the bell rang it might be a burglar). (42b) can only mean 
that each time the bell rang I did something which made Jane nervous.
 (42) a.  I made Jane worry/be worried/ be nervous every time the bell   
  rang.
 b.  I made Jane nervous every time the bell rang.        
Finally, floating distributive quantifiers can attach to atelic VPs, but not 
to APs:
(43)  a.  The medicine made Jane and Mary each be sick.
 b.  #The medicine made Jane and Mary each sick.
The conclusion is that VPs, whether telic or atelic, are modifiable by 
predicates which distribute over individuals as well as being modifiable by three 
times. APs do not denote sets of individuable entities, and these distributive 
modifiers cannot modify APs.
5. Countability in the verbal domain
We saw in section 2 that all VP predicates can be modified by counting 
modifiers, but that none can be directly modified by numerals. All VP predicates 
need the intervention of a classifier-like element times. All VP predicates can be 
modified by a lot with a plurality of events reading, as well as, for activities, an 
extended event reading. Furthermore, all VP predicates can be compared using 
less than, while fewer than is never acceptable except in conjunction with n 
times. 
 VPs then generally show apparently contradictory properties. On the 
one hand they have individuals and pluralities of individuals in their denotations, 
as shown by the plurality-of-events reading which is always available with often, 
a lot and more than. On the other hand, they cannot be counted without the 
classifier times, which, as we saw in example (17), chooses what counts as a 
single event in the relevant context, and they can only be compared using less. 
 This configuration of properties is very like the properties associated with 
object mass nouns, also called naturally atomic mass nouns (ROTHSTEIN, 2010), 
and neat mass nouns (LANDMAN, 2011, 2016). These are nouns like furniture, 
livestock, poultry, kitchenware, jewellery which denote sets of individuable 
entities, but which are not countable. We know they are not grammatically 
countable, since #three poultry, #three livestock, #three furniture(s) and similar 
examples are infelicitous. Countability is only possible if a classifier is used, as in 
three pieces of furniture, three head of livestock. However, there are several pieces 
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of evidence that object mass nouns denote sets of individuals. First, as shown 
by Rothstein (2010) and Schwarzschild (2011), these nouns can be modified 
by distributive adjectives like big as in the big furniture/livestock, and some 
expensive jewellery where big distributes over individual pieces of livestock or 
furniture and expensive distributes over individual pieces of jewellery. Similarly, 
lots of furniture/livestock is synonymous with a lot of pieces of furniture or 
many head of livestock. Second, a number of researchers, starting with Barner 
and Snedeker (2005), have shown that object mass nouns allow for comparisons 
in terms of cardinality. However, Grimm and Levin (2012), Rothstein (2017), 
Pires de Oliveira and Rothstein (2017) have all shown that object mass nouns 
differ from count nouns. While count nouns force comparison in terms of 
cardinality, object mass nouns allow comparisons along any contextually 
relevant dimension including the cardinal dimension. Thus (44a) must have a 
cardinal comparison, while the object mass noun allows either a cardinal or 
a volume comparison. If John has a grand piano, a huge cupboard and a sofa, 
while Bill has five folding chairs, then (44a) is false, no matter what the context. 
However, (44b), is naturally judged true, with the parenthetical material setting 
the context for a comparison in terms of volume.3
(44) a.  John has more pieces of furniture than Bill. 
         b.  John has more furniture than Bill, (so he will need the bigger  
  moving truck).
The same effects show up in the comparatives with atelic predicates in 
(45), with context determining whether a cardinal comparison or a comparison 
in terms of extent is more appropriate.  
(45)   a.  Last week, Mary ran more than John.
 b.  Last week, Mary practiced the piano more than John.
(45a) can be true if on the one occasion on which they ran, Mary ran 
a distance greater the distance John ran, in which case the comparison is in 
terms of temporal length, but can also be true if Mary ran on more occasions, a 
cardinal interpretation. (45b) is most naturally interpreted in terms of occasions. 
 Similar parallels show up with comparisons with less. Although object 
mass nouns allow cardinal comparisons, they can only be modified by the 
mass comparative less, as in (46a), while the countable classifier construction is 
modified by fewer, like a count noun (46b,c):
(46) a.  John has less furniture than Bill/ /#fewer furniture than Bill.  
 b.  John has fewer pieces of furniture than Bill /#less pieces of  
  furniture than Bill.
 c.  John has fewer chairs than Bill /#less chairs than Bill.
3  See Rothstein (2017), chapter 5 for detailed discussion.
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Less furniture in (46a) allows for either the cardinal or the volume 
interpretation, while fewer pieces of furniture in (46b,c) allows only the cardinal 
reading. 
 VPs, as we discussed in section 2 only allow comparison with less, but 
as with the object mass nouns in (46a), and the VP comparatives in (45), the 
comparison can be either in terms of cardinality or along a continuous dimension. 
 VPs, then, – both telic and atelic – look very similar to object mass nouns 
in terms of countability. Like object mass nouns, VPs denote sets of events which 
are not countable, but they make available sets of individuals which, in context, 
are available for cardinal comparisons, modification by often, plurality-of-event 
readings of a lot and so on. As with object mass nouns, counting requires the 
mediation of a classifier, in this case, the event-specific classifier time(s).
  Telic predicates differ from atelic predicates since they are not 
incrementally homogeneous. This means, for example, that a lot always as 
has a plurality of events interpretation when modifying telic predicates, and 
the effect is to make these telic predicates seem ‘more easily countable’ than 
atelic predicates. Rothstein (2008b) gives an explanation of this. The telic/atelic 
distinction is related to the availability of criteria for event individuation. Telic 
predicates are those that make explicit what may count as one individual event 
and thus make individuable events easily salient, while atelic predicates, which 
are incrementally homogeneous, do not. In (47a), the VP is telic, and we are 
told what counts as an individual event, namely an event of drinking a single 
glass of wine. In (47b,c), the VP is atelic, and we rely on context and real world 
knowledge to determine what counts as an individual event of drinking wine 
or running. This knowledge is a precondition for judging whether this kind of 
event happens often.  
(47)  a.  John drinks a glass of wine often.
 b.  John drinks wine often.
 c.  Mary runs often. 
So, telic predicates always make a set of individuable events salient, 
but, as research on object mass nouns has shown, the salience of a set of 
individuable entities does not make that set countable, since countability must 
be grammatically encoded.  
 In conclusion, I have argued in this paper that, at least in English, we 
have no evidence that countability is encoded in any verb meanings, and that 
the atelic/telic distinction cannot be reduced to an expression of the mass/count 
distinction in the verbal domain. In the verbal domain, as is the case for mass nouns, 
countability seems generally to be encoded by the use of verbal classifiers. The 
patterns of variation in the use and interpretation of verbal classifiers, distributive 
modifiers in the verbal domain and quantity modifiers such as a lot, suggest that 
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the atelic/telic distinction is better seen as a contrast in individuability, with 
telic VPs offering explicit criteria for picking out individuable events, and atelic 
VPs not doing so. This is in line with Rothstein’s (2004) characterization of the 
different aspectual lexical classes in terms of the different kinds of criteria used 
for picking out individuable events. On this general approach, lexical aspect, 
including the atelic/telic contrast is fundamentally concerned with criteria for 
event individuability.  
 This allows us to identify a major difference between the nominal and 
the verbal domains. The major grammatical contrast in the nominal domain in 
English focusses on the contrast between countable and non-countable, while in 
the verbal domain the focus is on the contrast between degrees of individuability. 
This observation reinforces recent work on the mass/count distinction, such as 
Rothstein (2010, 2017) which stresses the distinction between countability and 
individuability. 
 The account proposed here raises the obvious question of why the nominal 
and verbal domains should differ in this way. Why is individuation presupposed 
and countability grammatically encoded in count nouns, while criteria for 
individuation must be made explicit in the verbal domain? It is plausible that the 
answer to this question lies in the fundamental differences between events and 
objects, but pursuing the issue further is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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